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ESSAY I 
 
CAUSALITY BETWEEN CAPTIVE SUPPLIES AND CASH MARKET PRICES 
IN THE U.S. CATTLE PROCUREMENT MARKET 
 
Introduction 
Several studies in the cattle procurement literature have reported a negative relationship 
between cash market price and captive supply (Elam 1992; Schroeder et al. 1993; Ward 
et al. 1996; Ward, Koontz, and Schroeder 1998; Schroeter and Azzam 2004).
1
 One 
justification of the negative relationship is that the captive supply procurement methods 
could lower cattle prices in the cash market because the packers are already guaranteed a 
majority of cattle for slaughter (Zhang and Sexton 2000). A second justification is that 
captive supply sellers may control delivery time to receive the highest expected price 
(Schroeter and Azzam 2004). Therefore, when expected cash market price is low, captive 
supply would increase. The price dependent model is based on the first justification, 
while the second justification leads to the quantity dependent model in the literature.  
The two justifications are well reflected in the case of Pickett vs. Tyson Fresh 
Meats (Domina 2004; Taylor 2006). The plaintiff insisted that captive supplies caused 
low cash market price, while the defendant claimed that captive supply did not establish 
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the causation. The dependant claimed producer expectations of price caused producers to 
deliver more captive supply in the week when prices went down for other reasons. 
Initially, Tyson was ordered by the U.S. District Court to return $1.28 billion to all cattle 
producers who sold fed cattle directly to Iowa Beef Processor (IBP, now Tyson Fresh 
Meats) from February 1994 through April 30, 1999. However, the U.S. District Court 
Judge entered a final judgment in Tyson's favor in 2004. Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court 
denied the appeal of the lower-court decision in April 2006. Therefore, a crucial task in 
the literature of captive supply should be to investigate the causality between cash market 
prices and captive supplies. However, to our knowledge, no study has examined the 
causality directly. Finding the correct causal direction should provide useful information 
to the decades-long debates on packers’ anticompetitive behavior in the U.S. cattle 
procurement market, and should also help researchers find better econometric 
specifications for the cash price-captive supply relationship. 
The objective of this study is to investigate the causality between captive supplies 
and cash market prices in the U.S. cattle procurement market. The study particularly 
attempts to answer the question of whether packers use predetermined captive supply as 
an instrument to depress cash market price, or if feeders use the previous cash market 
prices as expected prices they will receive in the future to determine their cattle delivery. 
The Granger causality Wald test (Granger test), the Sims causality Wald test (Sims test), 
and the Granger causality with a modified Wald test (Modified Wald test) are used to 
examine the causality using weekly data of captive supply quantities and cash market 
prices in the U.S. cattle procurement market. We test the causal relationship between cash 
market price and total captive supply, and also test the relationships between cash market 
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price and each of the captive supply methods, such as marketing agreement, forward 
contract, and packer-fed cattle.  
All three tests, the Granger, the Sims, and the Modified Wald tests, indicate that 
cash market price is affected by total captive supply and marketing agreements. The 
Modified Wald test shows the bidirectional causality between cash market price and 
forward contract. This test also shows that packer-fed cattle do not cause cash market 
price and vice versa. The Granger and the Sims tests were not conducted for forward 
contract and packer-fed cattle because quantity and price series are differently integrated. 
Overall test results indicate that captive supply causes cash market price, and the results 
favor the price dependent model. 
Literature Review 
Two types of modeling approaches have been used in the literature to explain the 
negative relationship between captive supply and cash market price: the price dependent 
model and the quantity dependent model. Some researchers assume that packers’ captive 
supplies negatively affect cash market prices and model the relationship using the price 
dependent model (Elam 1992; Schroeder 1993; Ward, Koontz, and Schroeder 1998; 
Zhang and Sexton 2000). Both Elam (1992) and Schroeder (1993) estimate the impact of 
forward contract on cash price by regressing cash price on contract cattle shipments and 
other independent variables. Elam (1992) estimates that the average cash price of fed 
cattle decreases by less than $0.01/cwt for each increase of 1,000 head of contract cattle 
shipments, and Schroeder (1993) estimates that average fed cattle cash transaction prices 
are lowered by $0.15/cwt to $0.31/cwt as a result of forward contract cattle shipments. 
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Ward, Koontz, and Schroeder (1998) model transaction prices as a dependent variable 
and percentage deliveries from the inventory of forward contracted and marketing 
agreement cattle as independent variables. They find a negative relationship between fed 
cattle transaction prices and captive supplies, but corresponding coefficients are relatively 
small. Zhang and Sexton (2000) develop a non-cooperative game approach in a spatial 
analysis setting to show that processors can use exclusive contracts (captive supplies) to 
manipulate cash market prices. The study demonstrates that captive supplies can form an 
effective spatial barrier between firms through high buyer concentration and shipping 
costs.  
Others use quantity dependent models because they believe the quantities of 
delivery are determined by the expected price that sellers can be paid when they deliver 
their cattle to packers in the future. Schroeter and Azzam (2004) and Schroeter (2007) 
find that cash market prices or expected cash market prices form the negative relationship 
with delivery of captive supplies. Schroeter and Azzam (2004) insist that delivery-
scheduling decisions could lead to a negative relationship between the volume of captive 
deliveries and an ex ante expectation of a future price change in the cattle procurement 
activities of four large packing plants in Texas in the mid-1990s. Schroeter (2007) 
extends Schroeter and Azzam (2004) to a dynamic rational expectations model of 
delivery timing. He claims that sellers of marketing agreement and cash market have 
flexibility in scheduling cattle delivery while responding to changes in expected cattle 
price.  
Ward et al. (1996) use a quantity dependent model for the long-run analysis while 
it uses a price dependent model for the short-run analysis. In the long-run analysis, the 
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plant-level study finds that relative prices play a major role in determining the level of 
captive supplies for the 16 largest plants, but do not influence captive supply levels of the 
15 small plants. The study also finds that cash price variability is positively associated 
with the level of contract cattle for the 16 largest plants, but is not a determinant of 
packer-fed cattle or total levels of captive supplies. In the short-run analysis, Ward et al. 
show that the overall short-run impact of captive supply deliveries or inventories on fed 
cattle transaction prices is relatively small.  
As discussed, previous studies in the literature use either price dependent model 
or quantity dependent model to explain the negative relationship between captive 
supplies and cash market prices. However, no study in the literature has directly tested 
the causal direction between captive supply and cash market price. 
Captive Supply Arrangements in the Cattle Procurement Market 
Captive supplies include marketing agreement, forward contract, and packer-fed cattle in 
the cattle procurement market. For marketing agreement, a feeder and a packer make a 
contract which contains a price formula and an approximate number of cattle scheduled 
for delivery per year. Generally the feeder makes a decision about two weeks before the 
time of delivery on the amount of cattle to deliver to the packer for each week. When the 
delivery volume is set by the feeder for a given week, the packer usually decides the 
specific day or days of the week when delivery will be made. The price of cattle 
delivered through marketing agreement is calculated by several formulas which include 
base price, system of premia and discounts, and quality characteristics such as yield grade, 
quality grade, and carcass weight range. The base price is tied to the cash market prices 
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paid the week prior to delivery of the marketing agreement cattle (Schroeter and Azzam 
2004). For forward contract, the feeder delivers a specific number of cattle to the packer 
within a specific month. However, unlike the case of marketing agreements, the packer 
decides the scheduling of deliveries across weeks and days within the month. The number 
of forward contract cattle delivered in a given week is normally decided either one or two 
weeks in advance (Schroeter and Azzam 2004). The feeder and packer use basis forward 
contracting to price the forward contract cattle (Ward et al. 1996).
2
 Packer-fed cattle are 
owned by the packer prior to the time the cattle are ready for slaughter. Packers purchase 
feeder cattle and place them on feed in packer-owned or commercial feedlots. They are 
priced by a transfer pricing formula or cost accounting price (Ward et al. 1996). 
Causality Tests 
To investigate the direction of the causal relationship between captive supply and cash 
market price in the cattle procurement market, three causality tests: the Granger test, the 
Sims test, and the Modified Wald test are used in this study. 
Granger Test 
In the Granger test, a variable x  causes a variable y , if a variable y  can be predicted 
with greater accuracy by using past values of a variable x  rather than not using such past 
values while all other terms remain unchanged (Granger 1969). Three types of causality 
are feasible for our study. First, if )( yx  causes )(xy , but )(xy  does not cause )( yx , then 
a directional causality exists. Second, if x  causes y , and y  causes x , then a bidirectional 
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causality (feedback) exists. Finally, the third causality type is that the direction cannot be 
determined. 
Various ways to test for Granger causality exist. However, the most popular one 
is the one following a vector autoregressive (VAR) system as: 
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where 
t
y  and 
t
x  are assumed to be stationary, n and m are numbers of lags, and t1  and 
t2
  are white noise disturbances.  
The variable 
t
x  does not cause 
t
y  if 0
G
i
  for ni ,,2,1   and 0
G
j
  for 
mj ,,2,1  , but the variable ty  causes tx  if 0
G
j
  and 0
G
i
 . The implication of 
this model structure is that values of the process 
t
y  are influenced only by its own past 
but not by the past of 
t
x , while values of 
t
x  are influenced by the pasts of both
t
x  and 
t
y . A Wald test is used to test these hypotheses.
3
 Before applying the Granger test 
procedure, a pre-test needs to be conducted for potential unit root and cointegration 
problems. Then, the causality test is undertaken within the framework of VAR models 
(Konya 2004).  
Sims Test 
The Sims causality test (1980) is based on a notion that the future is not likely to cause 
the present. Therefore, in the Sims’s framework, the causality is tested via the following 
VAR model: 
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In this model, the causality test is conducted by testing for the leading values of 
t
x  and 
t
y  instead of testing for the lagged values of 
t
x  and 
t
y . If the parameters of the 
leading value of 
t
x  are not zero, i.e., 0S  for k,,2,1  , then ty  causes tx , and if 
the parameters of the leading value of 
t
y  are not zero, i.e., 0S for k,,2,1  , then 
t
x  causes 
t
y . The Sims test also uses the Wald test for the hypothesis tests.  
Modified Wald Test 
Both the Granger and Sims tests require time-series data pre-tested for potential unit root 
and cointegration problems (Konya 2004). When variables are stationary and are not 
cointegrated, then conventional asymptotic theory is valid for hypothesis testing in the 
VAR models. If variables are cointegrated, then one can use Error Correction Models 
(ECM). Therefore, one limitation of the Granger and the Sims tests may be that the 
direction of causality depends severely on pretests, more specifically unit root and 
cointegration tests. Toda and Yamamoto (1995) propose an alternative causality test, the 
Modified Wald test, that does not require any pretests. Unlike the Granger and the Sims 
tests, the Modified Wald uses the level data directly and therefore is valid even under 
uncertainty about integration and cointegration (Konya 2004). 
The Modified Wald test is conducted in VAR systems with augmented lag levels, 
dn   and dm  , where n  and m are the lag length for the variables, and d  is the 
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highest order of integration suspected in the system. Then, a bivariate framework for the 
Modified Wald test can be written as: 
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In this model the null hypothesis is 0
M
i
  for dni  ,,2,1   and 0Mj  for
dmj  ,,2,1  , and the test statistic follows an asymptotic 
2  distribution with the 
usual degrees of freedom, dn   and dm   (Toda and Yamamoto 1995). If the 
parameters of the value of 
t
x  are not zero, i.e., 0M
i
  for dni  ,,2,1  , then tx  
causes 
t
y , and if the parameters of the value of 
t
y  are not zero, i.e., 0Mj for 
dmj  ,,2,1  , then ty  causes tx . 
Data 
This study uses aggregate captive supply quantities of five regions including 
Texas/Oklahoma/New Mexico, Kansas, Nebraska, Colorado, and Iowa/Minnesota, and 
the cash market price is the weighted average price on a live weight basis of these five 
regions.
4
 Data were compiled from various reports from the Agricultural Marketing 
Service, USDA (USDA 2008). The data include 351 weekly observations of total captive 
supplies of cattle procurement from marketing agreement, forward contract, and packer-
fed cattle plus cash market price from August 2001 to May 2008. 
Table I-1 shows the descriptive statistics for the data. During the data period, the 
average cash market price was $82.98 per hundredweight of cattle, and total captive 
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supply accounted for 53.2% of all cattle procurement. Of the total captive supply, 
marketing agreement, forward contract, and packer-fed cattle accounted for 76.0%, 
10.7%, and 13.3%, and of all cattle procurement, accounted for 40.6%, 5.7%, and 7.0% 
respectively. 
As shown in table I-2, the correlation matrix of the five variables indicates a 
negative correlation of 62% between total captive supply and cash market price and a 
negative correlation of 72% between marketing agreement and cash market price. These 
negative correlations are already expected from previous studies discussed earlier. 
Forward contract reveals a positive correlation with cash market price. The correlation 
coefficient between cash market quantity and cash market price is small with 0.0745, but 
is insignificant. This indicates cash market price is correlated with captive supply rather 
than cash market quantity. Figure I-1 shows the trend of total captive supply quantity 
decreased by the end of 2004, but total captive supply was increasing slowly from the 
beginning of 2005 to May 2008. The trend of marketing agreement quantity is similar to 
the trend of total captive supply since the majority of the total captive supply quantity is 
accounted for by marketing agreement. Forward contract gradually increased from the 
beginning of 2006, but packer-fed cattle shows fluctuations with no increasing or 
decreasing trend. Overall, a negative relationship is observed between total captive 
supply and cash market price in Figure I-1. 
Econometric Procedure 
Before conducting the Granger and the Sims tests, unit roots are tested to determine 
whether economic variables are stationary or nonstationary. If variables do not have unit 
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roots, then the Granger and Sims tests can be conducted with level data. If variables have 
unit roots, then one can make the data stationary by taking the time-difference. If the 
variables are not cointegrated, then one can run the Granger and the Sims tests in the 
VAR with the differenced data. If the variables are cointegrated, then the Error 
Correction Model (ECM) needs to be introduced. The Modified Wald test is conducted 
without pretesting of unit root and cointegration. All variables are transformed into 
natural logarithms for all causality tests because the transformation tends to produce 
linear trends and constant variances when the variables have exponential growths and the 
variability of variables increase over time (Lutkepohl and Xu 2009). 
Unit Root Test 
The Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF) is carried out to check the stationarity using a 
zero mean equation (1.7), a single mean equation (1.8), and a trend equation (1.9): 
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The ADF test starts from the estimation of the most general model given by the 
trend equation, (1.9) to answer a set of questions on whether 0  or not. If 0 , then 
the variable in question has no unit root. If 0 , then one needs to move to the single 
mean equation (1.8) and test whether 0  or not. If 0  in equation (1.8), then the 
variable has no unit root. If 0 , then one moves to the zero mean equation, (1.7). If 
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0  in equation (1.7), this variable has a unit root. This process is the normal procedure 
for the ADF test.
5
 The lag length p  is determined by Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). 
Test results for unit root versus stationarity with level data are reported in table 3. The 
null hypotheses of unit root for marketing agreement, total captive supply, and cash 
market price are not rejected at the 5% significance level, while the null hypotheses of 
unit root for forward contract and packer-fed cattle are rejected at the 5% significance 
level. That is, marketing agreement, total captive supply, and cash market price are non-
stationary, while forward contract and packer-fed cattle are stationary based on the ADF 
test. For the non-stationary variables in table I-3, ADF tests are conducted with first 
differenced data, and results are reported in table 4. The null hypotheses of unit root for 
marketing agreement, total captive supply, and cash market price are all rejected at the 5% 
significance levels. Therefore, these variables are stationary at first differences. 
Consequently, we conclude that marketing agreement, total captive supply, and cash 
market price are integrated order 1, I(1), while forward contract and packer-fed cattle are 
not integrated, I(0). 
Cointegration Test  
Cointegration is an econometric property of time series variables. If two or more series 
are themselves non-stationary, but a linear combination of them is stationary, then the 
series are cointegrated (Engle and Granger 1987). For the Granger and the Sims tests, if 
the two variables are cointegrated, then we can find the long-run relationship of the two 
variables using ECM. However, if they are not cointegrated, then we can run VAR 
models for these tests.  
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The econometric literature offers several different cointegration tests such as the 
Engle and Granger approach, the Johansen approach, and the Shin approach (Konya 
2004). We apply the Johansen approach because this approach provides multiple 
cointegrating vectors with their respective speed of adjustment terms as a multiple 
equation approach, while a single equation approach gives a linear combination of the 
two long-run relationships (Johansen and Juselius 1990). 
Because marketing agreement, total captive supply, and cash market price have 
unit root, while forward contract and packer-fed cattle have no unit root, two 
cointegration tests need to be conducted: marketing agreement vs. cash market price and 
total captive supply vs. cash market price. Two VAR models with four time lags are 
tested to determine the numbers ( r ) of long-run stationary relationships. The lag length is 
selected based on AIC. In table I-5, the trace-test statistics on the rank indicate that both 
marketing agreement versus cash market price and total captive supply versus cash 
market price models have no cointegrating vectors ( r = 0). Therefore, we can conclude 
that marketing agreement and total captive supply are not cointegrated with cash market 
price during the data period.  
Another important task in testing the causality between captive supply and cash 
market price is to take into account the existence of time-lag between decision of captive 
supplies and their actual delivery. As discussed earlier, the quantity of captive supplies is 
usually determined by feeders two weeks and one or two weeks before they are delivered 
under the marketing agreement and forward contract, respectively (Schroeter and Azzam 
2004). The quantity of packer-fed cattle is totally dependent on the packer’s decision. 
Since the vast majority of captive supply comes from marketing agreement (76%), we 
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conduct all causality tests with a two week lag for each captive supply method and total 
captive supply. 
Empirical Results 
The Granger and the Sims tests were conducted for the causal relationship between cash 
market price and total captive supply and between cash market price and marketing                              
contract and cash market price and between packer-fed cattle and cash market price 
because forward contract and packer-fed cattle are integrated of order 0, while cash 
market price is integrated of order 1. Since the two sets of series (cash market price and 
forward contract, and cash market price and packer-fed cattle) are differently integrated, 
the causality test would provide meaningless results in the VAR model. For the Granger 
test, three week time lags (i.e., n  and m  are 3 in equations (1.1) and (1.2)) are chosen 
based on AIC for both sets of series: cash market price and marketing agreement, cash 
market price and total captive supply, and the results are reported in table I-6. In table I-6, 
the null hypothesis that cash market price does not cause marketing agreement is not 
rejected, while the null hypothesis that marketing agreement does not cause cash market 
price is rejected at the 5% level. Therefore, we can conclude that marketing agreement 
causes cash market price, but cash market price does not cause marketing agreement. For 
the relationship between total captive supply and cash market price, the null hypothesis 
that cash market price does not cause total captive supply is not rejected, while the null 
hypothesis that total captive supply does not cause cash market price is rejected at the 5% 
level. The test result suggests that total captive supply causes cash market price, but cash 
market price does not cause total captive supply.  
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The AIC also suggests that three-week time lags are most appropriate for both 
past values and future values for the Sims tests (i.e., n , m , and k  are 3 in equations (1.3) 
and (1.4)). Results from the Sims tests are reported in table I-7. The Sims tests also show 
that marketing agreement and total captive supply cause cash market price, but cash 
market price does not cause marketing agreement or total captive supply. 
Because the Modified Wald test does not require any pretests for unit root and 
cointegration, four VAR models are tested: market agreement and cash market price, 
forward contract and cash market price, packer-fed cattle and cash market price, and total 
captive supply and cash market price. From equations (1.5) and (1.6), time lags are 
chosen using AIC and are 3, 3, 2, and 3 (i.e., n  and m  are 3, 3, 2, and 3 in equations (1.5) 
and (1.6)) for causality tests between market agreement and cash market price, between 
forward contract and cash market price, between packer-fed cattle and cash market price, 
and between total captive supply and cash market price, respectively. In equations (1.5) 
and (1.6), the highest order of integration suspected in the system, d , should equal 1 for 
all models since marketing agreement, total captive supply, and cash market price are 
integrated of order 1, I(1). Therefore, the augmented lag levels, dn   and dm   for the 
VAR models of cash market price with marketing agreement, forward contract, packer-
fed cattle, and total captive supply should be 4, 4, 3, and 4, respectively. 
Table I-8 reports the results of the Modified Wald tests. For the causality between 
marketing agreement and cash market price, the null hypothesis that cash market price 
does not cause marketing agreement is not rejected, while the null hypothesis that 
marketing agreement does not cause cash market price is rejected at the 5% level. The 
hypothesis test indicates that marketing agreement causes cash market price. For the 
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relationship between total captive supply and cash market price, the null hypothesis that 
cash market price does not cause total captive supply is not rejected while the null 
hypothesis that total captive supply does not cause cash market price is rejected at the 5% 
level. The test suggests total captive supply causes cash market price. Therefore, the 
results of the Modified Wald tests for the causal directions between marketing agreement 
and total captive supply are consistent with those of the Granger and Sims tests. However, 
when the Modified Wald test is applied for the relationship between forward contract and 
cash market price, the null hypothesis that cash market price does not cause forward 
contract is rejected, while the null hypothesis that forward contract does not cause cash 
market price is also rejected at the 5% level. Forward contract shows bidirectional causal 
relationship with cash market price. For the relationship between packer-fed cattle and 
cash market price, both null hypotheses that cash market price does not cause packer-fed 
cattle and that packer-fed cattle does not cause cash market price are not rejected at the 5% 
level. The test result suggests no causal relationship between packer-fed cattle and cash 
market price.  
Causality test results reported in tables I-6 to I-8 are summarized in table I-9. All 
three tests indicate that marketing agreement and total captive supply cause cash market 
price. Forward contract and cash market price show bidirectional causal relationship from 
the Modified Wald test. However, the Modified Wald test finds no causal relationship 
between packer-fed cattle and cash market price.
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Conclusions 
One of controversial debates in the cattle procurement market is about the negative 
relationship between cash market price and captive supply. Some researchers claim the 
negative relationship is an indication of packers’ use of captive supply in lowering cash 
market price, while others claim it is merely a result of feeders’ use of previous cash 
market price as expected price in the future for their determination of delivery time. The 
two different arguments were effectively used in the case of Pickett vs. Tyson Fresh 
Meats for plaintiff and dependant, respectively, and led two alternative specifications: 
price and quantity dependent models in the literature.  
This study directly tests the causal direction between captive supply and cash 
market price using three causality tests: the Granger test, the Sims test, and the Modified 
Wald test. All three tests indicate that cash market price is caused by marketing 
agreement and total captive supply. The Modified Wald test shows the bidirectional 
causality between cash market price and forward contract. This test finds no causal 
relationship between cash price and packer-fed cattle. The Granger and the Sims tests 
were not conducted for forward contract and packer-fed cattle because quantity and price 
series are differently integrated. Overall test results indicate that captive supply causes 
cash market price, and the results favor the price dependent model over the quantity 
dependent model.  
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Notes 
1. The definition of captive supply by USDA Grain Inspection, Packers and 
Stockyards Administration (GIPSA) includes animals procured through 
forward contracts, marketing agreements, and packer feeding arrangements or 
otherwise committed to a packer more than 14 days prior to slaughter. 
2. For more detail, see Ward et al. (1996): p. 3. 
3. The Likelihood ratio (LR) test and Lagrange multiplier (LM) test can be used, 
but the Wald test is used in this study because the Wald test is usually more 
powerful and valid in small samples with linear hypothesis and linear model. 
For more detail, see Greene (2008): p. 498-504. 
4. We use an aggregated data of five regions because the cattle procurement 
market is national in scope, and all of the U.S. geographic fed cattle price 
reporting regions are reasonably well linked into a national fed cattle market. 
For example, some cattle are shipped over 1,000 miles to slaughter (Hayenga, 
Koontz, and Shroeder 1996; Muth and Wohlgenant 1998). 
5. For more detail, see Asteriou and Hall (2007): p. 297-298. 
6. We also conducted the three causality tests with a one-week lag for the 
relationship between total captive supply and cash market price because of the 
possibility of one-week lag due to forward contract and packer-fed cattle. All 
three tests show the same causality direction as the one with a two-week lag. 
However, when the Modified Wald test was conducted for the causality 
between forward contract and cash market price with a one-week lag, the test 
found that cash market price causes forward contract. The Modified Wald test 
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with a one-week lag found no causal relationship between packer-fed cattle 
and cash market price, which is the same result as the test result with a two-
week lag. 
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Table I-1. Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Variable 
Cash Market 
Price 
($/cwt) 
Total 
Procured 
Cattle (Head) 
Total Captive 
Supply 
(Head) 
Marketing 
Agreement 
(Head) 
Forward 
Contract 
(Head) 
Packer-
Fed Cattle 
(Head) 
Mean    82.98 403,759 214,856 164,752 22,489 27,614 
S.D.      9.96    63,631    48,432   47,414 13,327    7,343 
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Table I-2. Correlation Coefficients between Captive Supplies and Cash Market 
Price 
Variable 
Cash 
Market 
Price 
Marketing 
Agreement 
Forward 
Contract 
Packer-
Fed Cattle 
Total 
Captive 
Supply 
Cash 
Market 
Quantity 
Cash Market 
Price 
1.0000 
 
     
Marketing 
Agreement 
-0.7193 
< .0001 
1.0000 
 
    
Forward 
Contract 
0.3656 
<.0001 
-0.1027 
0.0547 
1.0000 
 
   
Packer-Fed 
Cattle 
-0.1186 
0.0268 
0.1092 
0.0409 
-0.2352 
< .0001 
1.0000 
 
  
Total Captive 
Supply 
-0.6225 
< .0001 
0.9523 
< .0001 
0.1353 
0.0112 
0.2019 
0.0001 
1.0000 
 
 
Cash Market 
Quantity 
0.0745 
0.1648 
-0.1313 
0.0141 
-0.1894 
0.0004 
0.0297 
0.5806 
-0.1723 
0.0012 
1.0000 
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Table I-3. Results of Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests at Levels 
Variable Unit Root Type Lags Tau Pr < Tau F Pr > F 
Marketing 
Agreement 
Yes 
Zero Mean 4 -0.33 0.5673   
Single Mean 4 -2.13 0.2337 2.30 0.4812 
Trend 4 -1.90 0.6555 2.26 0.7246 
Forward Contract No 
Zero Mean 4 0.05 0.6985   
Single Mean 4 -4.76 0.0001 11.37 0.0010 
Trend 4 -6.06 <.0001 18.39 0.0010 
Packer-Fed 
Cattle 
No 
Zero Mean 3 -0.21 0.6109   
Single Mean 3 -4.71 0.0002 11.09 0.0010 
Trend 3 -4.74 0.0007 11.27 0.0010 
Total Captive 
Supply 
Yes 
Zero Mean 4 -0.20 0.6145   
Single Mean 4 -2.44 0.1313 2.99 0.3044 
Trend 4 -2.26 0.4565 2.97 0.5814 
Cash Market 
Price 
Yes 
Zero Mean 3 0.58 0.8412   
Single Mean 3 -1.94 0.3129 2.09 0.5367 
Trend 3 -2.96 0.1455 4.39 0.2961 
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Table I-4. Results of Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests at First Differences 
Variable Unit Root Type Lags Tau Pr < Tau F Pr > F 
Marketing 
Agreement 
No 
Zero Mean 3 -12.64 <.0001   
Single Mean 3 -12.63 <.0001 79.75 0.0010 
Trend 3 -12.66 <.0001 80.19 0.0010 
Total Captive 
Supply 
No 
Zero Mean 3 -13.15 <.0001   
Single Mean 3 -13.13 <.0001 86.21 0.0010 
Trend 3 -13.16 <.0001 86.59 0.0010 
Cash Market Price No 
Zero Mean 2 -11.15 <.0001   
Single Mean 2 -11.16 <.0001 62.31 0.0010 
Trend 2 -11.15 <.0001 62.13 0.0010 
 
  
26 
 
Table I-5. Results of Cointegration Rank Tests Using Trace Statistics 
Variable vs. 
Cash Market Price 
H0: 
Rank=r 
H1: 
Rank>r 
Eigen 
value 
Trace 
5% Critical 
Value 
Results 
Marketing Agreement 
0 0 0.0348 17.8045 19.99 
No CI 
1 1 0.0160 5.5671 9.13 
Total Captive Supply 
0 0 0.0367 18.5381 19.99 
No CI 
1 1 0.0162 5.6368 9.13 
Note: “No CI” means that two time series are not cointegrated. 
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Table I-6. Results of the Granger Tests 
Null hypothesis (H0) DF Chi-Square 
Pr>Chi-
Square 
Results 
CP does not cause MA 3 5.96 0.1137 Not rejected 
MA does not cause CP 3 13.21 0.0042 Rejected 
CP does not cause CS 3 2.01 0.5712 Not rejected 
CS does not cause CP 3 18.61 0.0003 Rejected 
Note: CP is cash market price, MA is marketing agreement, and CS is total captive supply. 
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Table I-7. Results of the Sims Tests 
Null hypothesis (H0) DF Chi-Square 5% Critical Value Results 
CP does not cause MA 3   3.3777 7.8147 Not rejected 
MA does not cause CP 3 17.8351 7.8147 Rejected 
CP does not cause CS 3   1.1876 7.8147 Not rejected 
CS does not cause CP 3 25.0743 7.8147 Rejected 
Note: CP is cash market price, MA is marketing agreement, and CS is total captive supply. 
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Table I-8. Results of the Modified Wald Tests 
Null hypothesis (H0) DF Chi-Square Pr>Chi-Square Results 
CP does not cause MA 4 6.73 0.1510 Not rejected 
MA does not cause CP 4 20.36 0.0004 Rejected 
CP does not cause FW 4 15.05 0.0046 Rejected 
FW does not cause CP 4 17.02 0.0019 Rejected 
CP does not cause PK 3 1.53 0.6754 Not rejected 
PK does not cause CP 3 3.53 0.3171 Not rejected 
CP does not cause CS 4 2.48 0.6477 Not rejected 
CS does not cause CP 4 25.87 0.0001 Rejected 
Note: CP is cash market price, MA is marketing agreement, FW is forward contract, PK is 
packer-fed cattle, and CS is total captive supply. 
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Table I-9. Summary of Three Causality Tests 
Variables vs  
Cash Market Price 
Granger Test Sims Test 
Modified Wald 
Test 
Marketing Agreement MA→CP MA→CP MA→CP 
Forward Contract   FW↔CP 
Packer-Fed Cattle   PK ? CP 
Total Captive Supply CS→CP CS→CP CS→CP 
Note: CP is cash market price, MA is marketing agreement, FW is forward contract, PK is 
packer-fed cattle, and CS is total captive supply. 
MA→CP means marketing agreement cause cash market price, FW↔CP means 
bidirectional causal relationship, and ? means the causal relationship cannot be found. 
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Figure I-1. Weekly Captive Supplies and Cash Market Prices, August 2001 to May 
2008 
 
 
32 
 
ESSAY II 
 
DYNAMIC ASSESSMENT OF OLIGOPOLY, OLIGOPSONY POWER, AND 
COST EFFICIENCY IN THE U.S. BEEF PACKING INDUSTRY 
 
Introduction 
In recent years, concentration and captive supply have been two of the most controversial 
issues in the literature of market power in the U.S. beef packing industry. A wave of 
horizontal and vertical integrations in the beef packing industry began in the late 1970’s 
and has continued into the present market (Azzam 1997). The four-firm concentration 
ratio based on steer and heifer slaughter increased from 35.7 percent in 1980 to 83.2 
percent in 2003, while the ratio based on boxed beef supply increased from 52.9 percent 
in 1980 to 84.7 percent in 2000. Most recently, after JBS purchased Swift & Co. in 2007 
and JBS/Swift acquired Smithfield in 2009, the concentration ratio is expected to reach 
higher than ever. As a form of backward integration by packers, captive supply has also 
continuously increased over the last two decades.
1
 The captive supply ratio as a total of 
cattle slaughter increased from 20.5 percent in 1988 to 44.4 percent in 2002 (USDA
c
). 
As the horizontal merger continues and, as a result, the industry concentration 
increases in the beef packing industry, one important and interesting question is whether
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cost efficiency gains from increased concentration outweigh potential market power 
effects. As the captive supply ratio continuously increases, also disputable is whether 
captive supply increases the efficiency by reducing transaction costs and market risk or if 
it reduces competition and increases packers’ market power. However, few studies 
examine these two issues together in the economic analysis of market power in the U.S. 
beef processing industry. This study considers these two issues, concentration and captive 
supply, simultaneously in a model that can measure oligopoly and oligopsony market 
powers together. This model estimates marginal effects of concentration and captive 
supply on beef and cattle prices to answer a question, “Do horizontal and vertical 
integrations (merger and captive supply) in the beef packing industry increase social 
welfare by achieving economies of scale and reducing transaction costs?” This model is 
also developed to examine changing marginal effects over the sample period.  With a few 
exceptions (Appelbaum 1982; Schroeter 1988; Mei and Sun 2008), most previous studies 
in the literature assume that the conjectural variation is constant throughout the sample 
period. Therefore, they have limited explanations about how market power changes with 
evolving industry structure over time. Conjectural variations in the literature typically 
measure the overall market reaction to an individual firm’s changes in output supply and 
input demand (Dickson 1981). 
The objectives of this paper are threefold. First, oligopoly and oligopsony market 
powers for the U.S. beef retail market and cattle procurement market are estimated using 
the new empirical industrial organization (NEIO) model. In the modeling, oligopsony 
market power for the captive supply market is separated from oligopsony market power 
for the cash market. Second, the marginal effects of market power and cost efficiency 
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from increasing concentration and captive supply are measured to look into the impacts 
on packers’ margin. Finally, by adopting a time varying model, the changes of market 
power with changing market structure are estimated for the 1990-2006 time period with 
monthly data. 
Results show the presence of market power in both beef retail and cattle 
procurement markets. Oligopsony market power is greater and fluctuated more than the 
oligopoly market power for the entire sample period. Concentration and captive supply 
have a role in increasing market power as sources of market power in both markets. 
Merger benefits packers more in the beef retail market than in the cattle procurement 
market because the marginal effect of oligopoly market power on packer’s margin is 
greater than the marginal effect of oligopsony market power. Similar to the results of 
many previous studies, the current study also finds that the cost efficiency effects of 
increasing concentration and captive supply outweigh the market power effects. 
Literature Review 
Many researchers have used the NEIO framework to investigate market power issues in 
agricultural industries and some researchers provide reviews of these studies (Sexton 
2000; Sheldon and Sperling 2002; Whitley 2003). Among the articles that use the NEIO 
approach, a few studies compare market power effects versus cost efficiency effects from 
increased concentration in agricultural and food industries. Most industrial organization 
literature suggests that a merger’s efficiency gain offsets consumers’ or producers’ 
potential welfare losses (Azzam and Schroeter 1995; Azzam 1997; Tostao and Chung 
2005). Azzam and Schroeter (1995) model the tradeoff between regional oligopsony 
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power and cost efficiency that results from consolidation in the beef packing industry. 
They find the anticompetitive effects of consolidation are about half the actual cost 
savings from scale economies. Azzam (1997) models concentration as an explanatory 
variable in the margin equation for the cattle input market to estimate the concentration 
effect on the market power effect and the cost-efficiency effect for the U.S. beef packing 
industry. He finds the cost efficiency effect outweighs the oligopsony market power 
effect. Tostao and Chung (2005) model a bilateral oligopoly model to measure the effect 
of increased concentration on industry market power and cost efficiency. They also find 
cost efficiency gains dominate potential oligopoly market power effects from increased 
concentration in the U.S. wholesale beef industry. However, Lopez, Azzam, and Espana 
(2002) find that oligopoly market power effects dominate cost efficiency effects in the 
meat packing industry. They extend Azzam’s framework (1997) to oligopoly markets for 
32 U.S. food industries, and find that market power effects dominate cost efficiency 
effects in most food industries and suggest that further increases in concentration would 
increase output price. 
Numerous studies are concerned with captive supply, primarily focusing on the 
relationship between the captive supply and the cash market price to investigate the effect 
of captive supply on the cattle procurement market. Many studies report a negative 
relationship between captive supply and cash market price (Elam 1992; Schroeder et al. 
1993; Ward, et al. 1996; Ward, Koontz, and Schroeder 1998; Schroeter and Azzam 2004). 
Also, most researchers believe that this negative relationship reflects the market power of 
the packer as a buyer who uses the captive supply to suppress the cash market price in the 
cattle procurement market (Schroeder, et al. 1993; Ward, Koontz, and Schroeder 1998; 
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Zhang and Sexton 2000). These studies usually use an ad-hoc model to look into the 
relationship between captive supply and cash market price rather than use the 
theoretically based NEIO model to analyze the effect of captive supply as a source of 
market power in the industrial level. Only one study, for the U.S. pork packing industry, 
deals with captive supply using a NEIO model to measure market power (Zheng and 
Vukina 2009). They find that oligopsony market power exists in spot markets, but they 
do not find captive supply as a source of market power. They conclude that the market 
power is most likely due to concentration.  
Few studies estimate the change of market power across time (Appelbaum 1982; 
Schroeter 1988; Mei and Sun 2008). Appelbaum (1982) estimates the conjectural 
elasticities and oligopoly market powers for the rubber, textile, electrical machinery, and 
tobacco industries from 1947 to 1971. He finds the first two industries show competitive 
behavior and the last two show oligopolistic behavior. Schroeter (1988) estimates the 
conjectural elasticities for the beef packing industry from 1951 to 1983 and finds small 
but statistically significant oligopoly/oligopsony price distortions in that industry. Mei 
and Sun (2008) estimate oligopoly and oligopsony market power for the U.S. paper 
industry from 1955 to 2003, and find significant market power. Recently, Crespi, Xia, 
and Jones (2010) model the relationship between market power and cattle cycle. They 
find market power is affected by the cattle cycle, and the change of market power has the 
same trend with cattle cycle.  
The present study extends the existing literature of market power in the U.S. beef 
packing industry in two ways. First, the study considers captive supply as a potential 
source of market power in the NEIO framework. Second, the study investigates dynamic 
37 
 
changes of both oligopoly and oligopsony powers over the past several decades. 
Therefore, a newly developed NEIO model considers concentration and captive supply as 
potential sources of market power, and the effects of market power and cost efficiency 
are estimated in both static and dynamic frameworks. 
The Model 
Generally two approaches in developing theoretical framework of conjectural elasticity 
occur in the literature. One is the primal production function-based approach (Azzam and 
Pagoulatos 1990; Mei and Sun 2008), and the other is the dual approach based on a cost 
function (Schroeter 1988; Azzam 1997; Lopez, Azzam, and Espana 2002; Tostao and 
Chung 2005). In this paper, the dual approach is used because of an absence of quantity 
data for the output and input at the firm level. 
Following Schroeter (1988), beef processors and retailers are integrated in a 
single “processing-retailing” sector that is allowed to have oligopoly and oligopsony 
market powers simultaneously. A beef processing-retailing industry consists of N  firms 
converting a single farm input, cattle, into a final output, beef. As indicated earlier, two 
procurement channels, cash market and captive supply, are considered in this study. The 
captive supply for each period is given because the captive supply is determined before a 
packer decides the amount of cattle procured from the cash market. Therefore, the firms 
determine the cattle procured from the cash market to maximize the firm’s profit. A 
competitive market is assumed when farmers sell their cattle to packers, i.e. farmers are 
price takers. Each firm’s processing technology is characterized by fixed proportions 
between the farm input and the output (Schroeter 1988; Azzam 1997). Conversion of the 
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farm input into output requires non-farm inputs that are purchased in competitive markets. 
Each “processing-retailing” firm is not necessarily a price-taker both in the cattle 
procurement market and in the beef retail market. 
Profit, 
i
 , for the i th “processing-retailing” firm (for ),,2,1 Ni   is maximized 
as:  
(2.1)            ),())(()())(( 211211121
1
v
iiiiiii
q
qCqQWWqQWqqQPMax
i
 , 
where P  is the beef retail price, 
1
W  is the cash market cattle input price, 
2
W  is the 
captive supply cattle input price, 
i
q
1
 is the i th firm’s beef product or cattle input from 
the cash market,
 i
q
2
 is the i th firm’s beef product or cattle input from the captive supply,
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industry’s total beef product or total cattle input, 
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22 are the 
industry’s beef product or cattle input from cash market and captive supply, respectively, 
),( v
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qC  is the processing cost function for the i th firm, and v  is a vector of prices of 
non-farm inputs. The first order condition for profit maximization is: 
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Rearranging the first order condition and re-writing in an elasticity form yields: 
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M  is the i th firm’s margin, 1WP  ,  
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the i th firm’s conjecture about rivals’ responses to a change in cattle purchases or in final 
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product sales in the cash market, )1)(( QPQ
d
  and )1)((
111
QWQ
s
  are 
semi-price elasticities of retail demand and semi-price elasticities of farm supply for the 
cash market, respectively, 
1
2
W
W


  is the change of the captive supply price with respect 
to the change of cash market price, Qqs
ii
  is the i th firm’s  market share in the retail 
market and the cattle procurement market, and 
iiii
qqCqc
1
),(),(  vv is the marginal 
cost for the i th firm. 
 Following Azzam (1997), the i th firm’s cost function is assumed to take the 
generalized Leontief form: 
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where 
j
v  and kv  are the input price of labor, capital, and material. Rewriting equation 
(2.3) using a generalized Leontief cost function specified in equation (2.4) becomes: 
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Multiplying (2.5) by each firm’s market share, 
i
s , and summing across all n  firms in the  
industry yields:  
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Rearranging equation (2.6) yields the industry pricing equation as: 
(2.7)  
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where M  is the market-share weighted average margin for the beef packing industry,
 
 i isH
2
)(  is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index in the retail beef market and in the 
cattle procurement market,
 

i iii i
qq
2
1
2
1
)()(   is the market-share weighted 
average conjectural variation in the retail output market and in the farm input market, and 
m
e  is the error term for the margin equation (Cowling and Waterson 1976; Dickson 1981; 
Azzam 1997). 
In equation (2.7), the first three terms in the right-hand side capture mark-up in 
the beef retail market, mark-down in the cash cattle procurement market, and mark-down 
in the captive supply market, respectively. The fourth term is the market-share weighted 
average marginal cost for the integrated processing/retailing sector. The value of 1  
means no mark-up or mark-down occurs. In this case all firms are price-takers in the beef 
retail market and in the cattle procurement market, and therefore the output price or the 
farm-input price is unchanged. The value of 0  implies Cournot monopoly and 
monopsony. For noncompetitive conduct, concentration affects all mark-up, mark-down, 
and marginal costs in equation (2.7). Appelbaum (1982) defines conjectural variation 
elasticity as H)1(
*
 , which ranges between 0 and 1. The price elasticity of 
demand for the beef market and the price elasticity of supply for the cash cattle market 
are given by PE
dd
  and ,
1
WE
ss

 
respectively. Then, the degree of market power is 
defined by Lerner indices. The industry oligopoly market power is defined by
d
retail
EL
*
 , and the oligopsony market power for the cash market and the captive 
supply are defined by 
s
cash
EL
*
  and
s
captive
EQQL
*
12
)(   respectively (Lopez, 
Azzam, and Espana 2002). The value 0
*
  denotes perfect competition, 1
*
  
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denotes pure monopoly or monopsony, and other values denote various degrees of 
oligopoly or oligopsony power with higher values of *  denoting greater departures 
from perfect competition (Mei and Sun 2008). 
Marginal effects of packers’ margin from an increase of concentration in the 
processing/retailing industry can be separated into two parts: market power effects and 
cost efficiency effects. Differentiating equation (2.7) with respect to the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index, ,H results in: 
(2.8)                    
j
j
j
ssd
vQ
Q
Q
H
M













2
)1()1()1(
1
2 . 
The first three terms in the right-hand side of equation (2.8) capture market power effects 
and the fourth term captures cost savings for the beef packing industry (Azzam 1997; 
Lopez, Azzam, and Espana 2002).  
Marginal effects of captive supply on packers’ margin can also be derived by 
differentiating equation (2.7) with respect to captive supply, 
2
Q , as: 
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The first term in the right-hand side of equation (2.9) captures the market power effect, 
and the second term captures cost savings by changing captive supply. 
This study examines three main hypotheses. First, whether oligopoly market 
power and two oligopsony market powers (one from the cash market and the other from 
the captive supply market) in the U.S. beef packing industry equal zero or not? If these 
values are not zero, then the packers exert market power in the beef retail market, the 
cash cattle procurement market, and the captive supply market. Second, does increasing 
concentration and captive supply have an effect on the oligopoly and oligopsony market 
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powers? If they have an effect on the market power, then concentration and captive 
supply are sources of oligopoly and/or oligopsony market powers for packers. Finally, by 
increasing concentration and captive supply, do the cost efficiency effects outweigh the 
market power effects? If the cost efficiency effects outweigh the market power effects, 
then an increase of concentration and captive supply in the U.S. beef packing industry 
will increase social welfare. 
Empirical Procedures 
For complete identification, the price equation, equation (2.7), needs to be estimated 
simultaneously with three non-farm input demand equations, the farm input (cattle) 
supply equation, the retail output (beef) demand equation, and the captive supply price 
equation. Non-farm input demands are obtained by applying Shephard’s lemma on the 
industry level processing cost function represented by equation (2.4) as: 
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which can be re-arranged as: 
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where 
j
X  is the industry level derived non-farm input demand for labor, capital, and 
material, and 
j
e  is the error term for the non-farm input demand function. 
 Cattle supply and beef demand equations take the semi-logarithmic forms, which 
are specified as: 
(2.12)                    
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(2.13)                          
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where, as defined previously,
s
   and 
d
  are the semi-price elasticity of supply for the 
cash market and the semi-price elasticity of demand, respectively, cP  is corn price, sP  is 
sorghum price, aP  is calf price, fP  is fuel price, pP  is pork price, bP  is chicken price, 
I  is income, and 
s
e  and 
d
e are error terms for supply and demand equations, 
respectively.  
 Finally, the captive supply price (
2
W  ) is specified as a function of cash market 
price ),(
1
W cattle quantity procured through the captive supply (
2
Q ), the total procured 
cattle quantity ),(Q  and linear and squared time trend terms (
time  and ).
2
time  Then, the 
empirical model for the price of captive supply is: 
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where 
w
e  is the error term. The cash market price, ,1W is included as an independent 
variable because the price of cattle through captive supply (marketing agreement and 
forward contract) is calculated using various formulas that are closely tied to cash market 
price (Schroeter and Azzam 2004). Data for captive supply price is not available from 
1990 to 2002 before implementing the mandatory price reporting. Therefore, equation 
(2.14) is separately estimated to find the value,  , with the monthly data from 2003 to 
2007. The result of estimation shows that 
 
is 0.7320, and is significant at the 5% 
significance level.
2
 This value is not much different from Zheng and Vukina (2008)’s 
value, 0.7835, for the U.S. pork industry.
3
  
Static Estimation 
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Equations (2.7), (2.11), (2.12), and (2.13), which constitute a system of six equations in 
total are simultaneously estimated while equation (2.14) is separately estimated due to the 
data limitation described above: that the captive supply price data is not available from 
1990 to 2002. To overcome potential endogeneity problems in the simultaneous equation 
estimation, an instrumental variable estimator, generalized method of moments (GMM), 
is employed in this study. GMM is also used because the Breushch-Godfrey Test for 
autocorrelation (Breusch 1978; Godfrey 1978) rejects the null hypothesis of no first-order 
autocorrelation on each equation’s residuals. The seventeen instrumental variables 
included in the equation are the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for the steer and heifer 
slaughter, the squared Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, the four-firm concentration ratio for 
cattle procurement market, the squared four-firm concentration ratio, cattle cash price, 
cattle price, four-firm captive supply ratio, labor price, capital price, material price, corn 
price, sorghum price, calves price, fuel price, pork price, chicken price, income, and time. 
Dynamic Estimation 
The static econometric specification discussed in the previous section can estimate only 
one constant market conduct parameter,  , for the entire sample period. The static model 
cannot allow possible changes of the market conduct parameter over time. However, as 
suggested in a few previous studies (Schroeter 1988; Azzam 1997; Lopez, Azzam, and 
Espana 2002; Mei and Sun 2008), the market conduct parameter can vary over time as 
market environment (for example, market concentration) changes.
4
 To accommodate the 
potential varying nature of the market conduct parameter over the sample period, the 
market conduct parameter is modeled as a function of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, 
H , and the captive supply, 
2
Q , as: 
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 Equations (2.15) and (2.16) allow the conjectural variation parameter,  , to not 
only vary over time, but also to measure change in market powers and marginal effects of 
concentration and captive supply on packer margin over time. Differentiating equation 
(2.16) with respect to the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, H , and with respect to the 
captive supply, 
2
Q , respectively yields:   
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Equations (2.17) and (2.18) measure concentration effects and captive supply effects on 
the margin of the dynamic market conduct, while equations (2.8) and (2.9) measure those 
of the static market conduct. In the dynamic model, the marginal effect of captive supply 
influence to not only the mark-down in the captive supply but also the mark-up in the 
retail market and mark-down in the cash market. 
Equations (2.16), (2.11), (2.12), and (2.13) are estimated for the dynamic model. 
The dynamic conjectural variation elasticity, 
*
 , and market power parameters, retailL , 
cash
L , and captiveL  can be estimated using the estimated values of ic , Herfindahl-
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Hirschman Index, captive supply, and estimated supply and demand price elasticities. For 
the static and dynamic model, the market power parameters, marginal effects of 
concentration and captive supply on margin, and their standard errors are also estimated 
through GMM using the MODEL Procedure in SAS 9.2. 
Data 
The main data set used in this study comes from the Agricultural Marketing Service 
(AMS), the National Agricultural Statistic Service (NASS), Grain Inspection, Packers 
and Stockyards Administration (GIPSA), and the Economic Research Service (ERS) of 
the United State Department of Agriculture (USDA). Monthly data series for 1990 to 
2006 are complied for all variables listed in the empirical procedure.  
The cattle slaughter quantity in total live weight, which is used as the total beef 
production and the total cattle input supply (due to the fixed proportion assumption) is 
compiled from Livestock Slaughter Annual Summary of NASS (USDA
d
). The cash 
market cattle price data is from several long-term fed cattle price data sets of the 
Mandatory Price Report (MPR) of AMS, which have reported the Nebraska direct fed 
steer price (USDA
a
). The cash market cattle price is modified by multiplying with 2.4 as 
a conversion factor to produce a unit of retail beef (USDA
b
). The weighted captive 
supply price is combined from MPR of AMS, but captive supply price data is only 
available from 2003 to 2007. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, the four-firm 
concentration ratio, and the four-firm captive supply ratio for the steer and heifer 
slaughter are compiled from annual reports from the Packers and Stockyards Statistical 
Reports (1996-2006) GIPSA (USDA
c
). 
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For the beef demand equation and the cattle supply equation, the retail price of 
beef, the retail price of pork, the wholesale price of chicken, the corn price, and the calf 
price are from ERS (USDA
b
). The fuel oil number 2 price is obtained from the Consumer 
Price Index Database of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), U.S. Department of Labor 
(USDL). Per capita income data is from the econstats site (http://www.econstats.com). 
The consumer price index for meat and the producer price index for farm products are 
from BLS (USDL). These two price indices are used as price deflators for beef prices and 
cattle prices respectively.  
For the marginal cost and non-farm input demand equations, the price index and 
the productivity index of labor for the U.S. animal slaughtering and processing industries 
are obtained from the Industry Productivity and Costs Database of BLS (USDL). The 
price index and the productivity index of capital and material for U.S. food and other 
industries are obtained from the Major Sector Multifactor Productivity Index Database of 
BLS (USDL). The definitions and descriptive statistics of these variables are presented in 
table II-1. 
Empirical Results 
Estimation results of static and dynamic models are reported in table II-2. For the static 
model, all of the 20 parameter estimates are statistically significant at the 5% significance 
level except the parameter estimate for pork price which is statistically significant at the 
10% significance level. The coefficient of conjectural variation,   -0.9016, is tested for 
pure monopoly or pure monopsony( 0 ) and also for perfect competition( 1 ). 
Both null hypotheses are rejected at the 1% significance level. Therefore, results indicate 
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that oligopoly and oligopsony conducts exist in the U.S. beef packing industry. The semi-
price elasticities of supply and demand are 0.005 and -0.003, respectively, and show 
expected signs. For the dynamic model, conjectural variation is specified as a function of 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and captive supply, which allows one to estimate 
changes in conjectural elasticity, 
*
 , and market power parameters retailL , cashL , and 
captive
L  over time. The magnitude of parameter estimates and overall fitness are 
comparable to those from the static GMM estimation. Most of coefficients including an 
additional coefficient in the conjectural equations (
2
c ) are significant at the 5% 
significance level, but the coefficient for Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (
1
c ) is not 
significant. The average value of the conjectural variation,   -0.8735, the semi-price 
elasticities of supply and demand are 0.0051 and -0.003 respectively.  
Using the estimates of parameters reported in table II-2, the conjectural elasticity, 
*
 , and degrees of market power: oligopoly market power, retailL ,  oligopsony market 
power from the cash market, cashL , and oligopsony market power from the captive supply 
market, 
captive
L , are calculated and reported in table II-3 for both static and dynamic 
models. For the static model, the conjectural elasticity is 0.0188, the oligopoly market 
power, retailL , is 0.0197, the oligopsony market power from the cash market, cashL ,  is 
0.0233, and the oligopsony market power from the captive supply, 
captive
L , is 0.0073.
5
 
They are all significant at the 1% significance level. The Lerner index, 0.0197, from the 
retail market indicates a 1.97% mark-up in the beef price, while Lerner indices, 0.0233 
and 0.0073, from the cattle procurement market suggest 2.33% and 0.73% mark-downs in 
the cattle price, respectively. For the dynamic model, the average value of varying 
conjectural elasticities is 0.0242, the average value of oligopoly market power, retailL , is 
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0.0253, the average value of oligopsony market power for the cash market, cashL ,  is 
0.0294, and the average value of oligopsony market power for the captive supply, 
captive
L , 
is 0.0093. They are all significant at the 1% significance level. The dynamic values are 
slightly greater than the static values. The results imply that market power exists in both 
beef retail and cattle procurement markets. The oligopsony market power from captive 
supply is smaller than the oligopsony market power from the cash market. However, the 
summation of Lerner indices from captive supply and cash markets shows larger market 
power in the cattle procurement market than in the retail market from both static and 
dynamic models. These results are consistent with the findings of Tostao and Chung 
(2005).  
Dynamic changes of market power for the U.S. beef packing industry from 1990 
to 2006 are graphically illustrated in figure II-1. During the period of 1990-2006, the 
maximum value of oligopoly market power is 0.0284 in 2000, the minimum value is 
0.0237 in 1990. The maximum value of oligopsony power is 0.0488 in 2002, and the 
minimum value is 0.0316 in 1990. Figure II-1 shows the oligopoly power is always 
smaller than the oligopsony power throughout the data period. The oligopsony power is 
quite fluctuating, while oligopoly power is relatively steady. The oligopsony market 
power from the cash market is always larger than the market power from the captive 
supply market. However, in recent years the market power caused by captive supply has 
been increasing while the market power from the cash market has been decreasing. The 
overall trend of oligopsony power is dominated by the market power from the cash 
market until 1999.  However, after 1999, the overall trend of oligopsony power follows 
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the market power trend from the captive supply market, which is perhaps due to the 
recent increase in captive supply in the U.S. cattle procurement market.  
 Marginal effects of market concentration on packer margin (retail price minus 
farm price) are calculated by equation (2.8) for the static model and equation (2.17) for 
the dynamic model and are reported in table II-4. As discussed previously, marginal 
effects are separated into market power and efficiency effects. The market power effects 
are further separated into three parts: effects from oligopoly, oligopsony from the cash 
market, and oligopsony from the captive supply market. From the static model, the 
oligopoly effect, the oligopsony effect from cash market and captive supply, and the cost 
efficiency effect are 33.06, 19.65, 6.18, and -198.68, respectively. The total effect is -
139.78, which indicates the cost efficiency effect outweighs the market power effect. The 
estimated effects are all statistically significant at the 1% significance level. The results 
suggest that if the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index increases 0.01, then the packer margin 
will increase about 0.33 $/cwt by oligopoly effect, 0.20 $/cwt by oligopsony effect from 
cash market, 0.06 $/cwt by oligopsony effect from captive supply, respectively and will 
decrease by 1.99 $/cwt by cost efficiency effect, and overall the margin will decrease by 
1.40 $/cwt. This result contradicts to a common belief that packers pursue merger to 
increase their margin. However, this result can be interpreted to show that even though 
their margin for a unit of product decrease, packers’ total margin could be increased by 
increasing their total quantity and they could reinforce their potential bargaining position 
in the market with merger and integration.  
From the dynamic model, the oligopoly effect, the oligopsony effect from cash 
and captive supply markets, the cost efficiency effect, and the total effect are calculated 
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for each year. Average values of these effects are 60.12, 35.04, 11.03, -253.98, and -
147.80, respectively. They are also statistically significant at the 1% significance level. 
This result is similar to the result of the static model. These results suggest that merger is 
more effective in the beef retail market than in the cattle procurement market to exercise 
packer’s market power, and that as concentration increases, the packer margin increases 
in both oligopoly and oligopsony markets while cost efficiency also exists. The cost 
efficiency effect overwhelmingly dominates the market power effects in both static and 
dynamic models. This outcome is consistent with the findings of Azzam and Schroeter 
(1995), Azzam (1997), Sexton (2000), and Tostao and Chung (2005), but contradicts to 
those of Lopez, Azzam, and Espana (2002).  
The marginal effects of captive supply on packers’ margin are also calculated in 
table II-5. The oligopsony effect, the cost efficiency effect, and the total net effect are 
1.11, -10.95, and -9.83, respectively, in the static model. The results indicate if the 
captive supply increases by 100,000 cwt, then packer margin will increase by 0.01 $/cwt 
due to oligopsony effect, decrease by 0.11 $/cwt due to cost efficiency effect, and 
decreases by 0.10 $/cwt due to total net effect, respectively. For the dynamic model, the 
average values for the oligopoly effect, the oligopsony effects from cash market and 
captive supply, the cost efficiency effect, and the total net effect are 1.08, 0.63, 2.17, -
13.99, and -10.11, respectively. These values are statistically significant at the 1% 
significance level. These results suggest that increasing the captive supply expands the 
oligopsony market power, but the cost efficiency effect dominates the market power 
effect by increasing captive supply. 
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In summary, the first null hypothesis that the oligopoly market power and 
oligopsony market power in the U.S. beef packing industry equal zero is rejected in the 
static and dynamic model. Therefore, market powers are exerted in both the beef retail 
market and the cattle procurement market, but the oligopsony market power is larger than 
the oligopoly market power. Second, concentration and captive supply have an effect on 
oligopoly and oligopsony market power. This conclusion implies that packers use 
concentration and captive supply as sources of market power, but the marginal effect on 
market power by increasing concentration is more effective in the beef retail market than 
in the cattle procurement market. Finally, by increasing concentration and captive supply, 
the cost efficiency effect outweighs the market power effect in both the static and 
dynamic models. Consequently, an increase of concentration and captive supply in the 
U.S. beef packing industry increases social welfare. 
Conclusions 
During the last two decades, concentration and captive supply have been two important 
issues in studying market power in the U.S. beef packing industry. This paper contributes 
to the literature of market power in the U.S. beef packing industry in three ways. First, 
the oligopoly and oligopsony market powers are simultaneously considered, and the 
oligopsony market power is divided by two parts: cash cattle procurement market power 
and captive supply market power. Second, a NEIO approach developed in this study can 
measure the market power of retail market, cash cattle market, and captive supply based 
on parameter estimates of concentration and captive supply. Marginal effects of 
concentration and captive supply on margin can also be measured in this study. Third, the 
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time varying model is applied to look into the dynamic change of market conducts such 
as conjectural elasticity and oligopoly and oligopsony market powers. The time-varying 
model allows one to dynamically calculate the change of market power in the U.S. beef 
packing industry.  
The empirical results show the presence of market power in both the beef retail 
and the cattle procurement markets, but their magnitudes are not seriously large. 
Concentration and captive supply have a role as sources of market power. Especially, the 
market power from captive supply shows an increasing trend with an increasing portion 
of captive supply in the cattle procurement method. Additionally and perhaps more 
importantly, results show that the cost efficiency effects from the increased concentration 
and captive supply outweigh the market power effects in the U.S. beef packing industry. 
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Notes 
1. The definition of captive supply by USDA Grain Inspection, Packers and 
Stockyards Administration (GIPSA) includes animals procured through forward 
contracts, marketing agreements, and packer feeding arrangements or otherwise 
committed to a packer more than 14 days prior to slaughter. 
2. In estimating equation (2.14), the RESET test is conducted, and results indicate 
that the linear model specified in equation (2.14) is appropriate with the power 2, 
3, and 4 at the 5% significance level. However, the Durbin-Watson test suggests 
an autocorrelation problem in this model. Therefore, a GLS procedure is 
implemented to estimate the parameters. Results show: 
0
  = 24.3025,   = 
0.7320, 
1
  = 3.9214, 
2
  = -3.4516, 
3
  = 0.2178, and 4  = -0.0038. All 
coefficients are significant at the 5% significance level. 
3. Zheng and Vukina (2008) estimate elasticity of captive supply price with respect 
to cash market price,
2
1
1
2
W
W
W
W


, rather than 
1
2
W
W


 in the similar equation for the 
U.S. pork industry. The estimated elasticity from Zheng and Vukina (2008) is 
0.7835 while the corresponding elasticity from our study is 0.6259. 
4. Azzam (1997) and Lopez, Azzam, and Espana (2002) use time varying models to 
specify the conjectural variation parameter as a function of the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index. However both studies fail to reject the null hypothesis that the 
conjecture variation parameter is a constant. Mei and Sun (2008) modeled the 
conjectural variation parameter as a function of the four-firm concentration ratio 
and average mill capacity for the U.S. paper industry. Appelbaum (1982) modeled 
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the conjectural elasticity as a function of labor input price, capital input price, and 
material input price. Schroeter (1988) also modeled the time varying parameter of 
conjectural variation as a function of labor input price, capital input price, and 
time trend for the U.S. beef packing industry. 
5. Boundaries of each Lerner index are estimated based on,
 
||10
)(sd
EL  . They 
are 0<
retail
L <1.0384, 0<
cash
L <1.2422, and 0<
captive
L <0.3910, respectively. The 
minimum value, 0, leads to perfect competition, and the maximum values lead to 
pure monopoly or pure monopsony. 
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Table II-1. Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used in the Empirical Estimation 
(1990.1-2006.12, N=204) 
Variable Symbol Mean S. D. Minimum Maximum 
Herfindahl Hirschman index for 
steer and heifer slaughter 
H  0.1912 0.0116 0.1661 0.2096 
Cattle slaughter weight (bil./lbs) Q  3.4675 0.2787 2.8087 4.1485 
Retail price of beef ($/cwt) P  317.77 48.24 271.00 431.72 
Cash market price ($/cwt) 
1
W  73.46 9.00 58.28 105.5 
Captive supply price ($/cwt) 
2
W  85.91 5.39 74.62 99.45 
4 firm concentration ratio CR
 
79.25 2.82 71.6 83.2 
4 firm captive supply ratio CAPR
 
28.80 10.04 10.30 52.90 
Price of corn ($/bushel) cP  2.31 0.45 1.52 4.43 
Price of sorghum ($/bushel) sP  2.23 0.53 1.41 4.28 
Price of calves ($/cwt) aP  101.58 20.91 55.40 149.00 
Price of fuel oil #2 ($/gallon) fP  1.25 0.47 0.83 2.65 
Labor productivity (2000=100) lXQ  100.73 3.11 95.19 109.17 
Retail price of pork ($/cwt) pP  243.99 27.08 199.33 289.76 
Whole. price of chicken ($/cwt) bP  37.68 11.99 16.00 66.80 
Per capita income (thousand $) I  12.40 1.30 10.47 14.61 
Price of labor (2000=100) lv  98.27 7.79 83.50 110.39 
Capital productivity (2000=100) cXQ  101.45 1.73 99.53 105.59 
Price of capital (2000=100) cv  94.51 1.72 99.53 105.59 
Material productivity (2000=100) mXQ  
102.68 2.76 98.71 109.87 
Price of material (2000=100) mv  
101.96 9.57 87.62 121.27 
PPI for farm product (2000=100) PPI
 
109.54 8.63 94.77 135.78 
CPI for meat (2000=100) mCPI  
98.75 11.96 81.61 122.01 
CPI for fuel (2000=100) fCPI  100.23 16.51 79.69 144.31 
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Table II-2. GMM Estimates of Parameters and Conjectural Variation from Static 
and Dynamic Models for the U.S. Beef Packing Industry 
Parameter Variable Static Model Dynamic Model 
Conjectural Variation 
  
      0c  Constant   -0.9016 (0.0294)**     -0.8380 (0.0405)** 
     1c  H   
-0.2742 (0.1729) 
      2c  2Q   
     0.0168 (0.0053)** 
Supply Function 
  
0

 
Constant    0.8010 (0.0510)**     0.7905 (0.0504)** 
S
  
1
W     0.0050 (0.0003)**     0.0051 (0.0003)** 
1
  
corn
P     0.0405 (0.0145)**     0.0416 (0.0145)** 
2
  
sorghum
P    -0.0194 (0.0056)**    -0.0189 (0.0057)** 
3

 
calves
P    -0.0069 (0.0004)**    -0.0069 (0.0004)** 
4
  fuelP    -0.0998 (0.0110)**    -0.1045 (0.0102)** 
Demand Equation  
 
0

 
Constant    1.2675 (0.0583)**     1.2755 (0.0544)** 
r
d

 
P    -0.0030 (0.0002)**    -0.0030 (0.0001)** 
1
  
pork
P  -0.0003 (0.0002)*  -0.0003 (0.0002)* 
2
  
chicken
P     0.0004 (0.0002)**     0.0004 (0.0002)** 
3

 
INCOME     0.0384 (0.0014)**     0.0379 (0.0013)** 
Cost Function  
 
ll

 
2/1
)(
ll
vv
 
 12.1328 (0.1525)**  10.4849 (0.1012)** 
cc
  2/1)(
cc
vv    -8.2483 (0.1147)**   -9.8505 (0.1162)** 
mm
  2/1)(
mm
vv    -3.2792 (0.0485)**  -6.1839 (0.0786)** 
lc
  2/1)(
cl
vv    -2.6343 (0.0329)**  -2.9081 (0.0310)** 
cm
  2/1)(
mc
vv   12.1509 (0.1545)** 14.0481 (0.1488)** 
ml
  2/1)(
lm
vv    -8.8166 (0.1135)**  -7.3248 (0.0772)** 
l

 l
v     0.4401 (0.0232)**   0.7261 (0.0248)** 
c
  
c
v    -1.2847 (0.0172)**  -1.3708 (0.0147)** 
m
  
m
v     0.4859 (0.0208)**   0.2118 (0.0223)** 
Notes: Parentheses are approximate standard errors. 
           *  significant at the 10% significance level. 
           ** significant at the 5% significance level. 
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Table II-3. Conjectural Elasticity and Market Power for the U.S. Beef Packing 
Industry 
Market Power Static Model Dynamic Model 
Conjectural Elasticity (
*
 ) 0.0188 (0.0056) 0.0242 (0.0058) 
Oligopoly Power in Retail Market (
retail
L ) 0.0197 (0.0061) 0.0253 (0.0064) 
Oligopsony Power in Cash Market (
cash
L ) 0.0233 (0.0069) 0.0294 (0.0068) 
Oligopsony Power in Captive Supply (
captive
L ) 0.0073 (0.0021) 0.0093 (0.0022) 
Note: Parentheses are standard errors. 
          All estimates are statistical significant at the 1% significance level. 
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Table II-4. Marginal Effects of Market Concentration on Margin for the U.S. Beef 
Packing Industry from 1990 to 2006  
Marginal Effect Static Model (cents/cwt) Dynamic Model (cents/cwt) 
Oligopoly     33.06 (10.171)    60.12 (13.767) 
Oligopsony Cash Market     19.65 (5.8021)    35.04 (7.6204) 
Oligopsony Captive Market      6.18 (1.8263)    11.03 (2.3986) 
Cost Efficiency -198.68 (18.192) -253.98 (18.093) 
Total Effect -139.78 (10.959) -147.80 (19.614) 
Note: Parentheses are standard errors. 
          All estimates are statistical significant at the 1% significance level. 
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Table II-5. Marginal Effects of Captive Supply on Margin for the U.S. Beef Packing 
Industry from 1990 to 2006 
Marginal Effect Static Model (cents/cwt) Dynamic Model (cents/cwt) 
Oligopoly -    1.08 (0.3420) 
Oligopsony Cash Market -    0.63 (0.1991) 
Oligopsony Captive Market    1.11 (0.3289)    2.17 (0.4369) 
Cost Efficiency -10.95 (1.0024) -13.99 (0.9969) 
Total Effect   -9.83 (0.7760) -10.11 (1.0452) 
Note: Parentheses are standard errors.  
          All estimates are statistical significant at the 1% significance level. 
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Figure II-1. Changes of Market Power for the U.S. Beef Packing Industry from 1990 
to 2006 
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ESSAY III 
 
DYNAMIC ASSESSMENT OF BERTRAND OLIOGOPSONY IN THE U.S. 
CATTLE PROCUREMENT MARKET 
Introduction 
Most studies using the new empirical industrial organization (NEIO) approach on the 
market power of the U.S. beef packing industry focus on the market structure, such as 
horizontal concentration and vertical integration, as sources of market power rather than 
characteristics of the market such as cattle cycle and seasonality. Also, the studies 
generally use the Cournot model by assuming quantity competition in the cattle 
procurement market.  
Cattle production fluctuates unpredictably based on weather conditions and 
economic environment while beef demand is relatively stable and predictable. The 
fluctuation of cattle production leads to price fluctuation and these variations could 
influence the bargaining position of producers and packers in the cattle procurement 
market (Crespi, Xia, and Jones 2010). Therefore, the periodic fluctuation of the cattle 
production, cattle cycle and seasonality, could affect market power in the cattle 
procurement market. In addition, this fluctuation in cattle supply could make packers 
compete with price rather than quantity to maximize profit. 
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In the long-run, packers make significant production decisions based on quantity 
such as increasing factory size, purchasing slaughter machines or packing machines, as 
well as other investments. These decisions could lead to quantity competition. However, 
in the short-run, cattle purchase could lead to price competition (Lepore 2008). Under the 
condition of fixed plant capacity, if packers’ cattle amount is not guaranteed in the cattle 
market during the short cattle supply then they would aggressively bid to obtain their 
optimal operation level of cattle for beef production. On the other hand, if there is enough 
cattle supply in the market, then packers might try to lower the cattle price under the 
marginal cost for cattle production. This strategy for packers is consistent with the 
structural conduct performance (SCP) theory (Stiegert, Azzam, and Brorsen 1993). 
Additionally, the reason why packers gradually increase the volume of alternative 
marketing arrangements (captive supply) could be explained by this view point. Packers 
can reduce cattle supply risk and price competition by increasing captive supply during 
the short cattle supply and they might be tacitly collusive to lower the cattle price during 
the excess cattle supply. From this perspective, the cattle cycle and seasonality may affect 
pricing and market power in the cattle market. It therefore stands to reason that the 
Bertrand model is more accurate than the Cournot model to measure the oligopsony 
market power for the cattle procurement market. 
The objective of this paper is three fold. First, this paper provides a conceptual 
framework for the Bertrand model to analyze oligopsony market power and to compare 
the Bertrand model with the Cournot model. Second, this paper estimates the overall 
market power with the static model and annual market power changes with the dynamic 
model at national and two regional levels. Finally, the effects of concentration, cattle 
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cycle, and seasonality on markdown for cattle price are estimated to look into how they 
influence on market power in the U.S. cattle procurement market.  
The empirical results show that oligopsony market power exists in the cattle 
procurement market and that oligopsony market power is affected by cattle cycle and 
seasonality and, finally, that the variation of market power changes equivalently with the 
cattle cycle. However, concentration has a negative effect on market power in the cattle 
procurement market. 
Concentration, Cattle cycle, and Seasonality 
The concentration for cattle procurement was drastically increased during the 1980’s and 
has stayed at high levels after 1990 (USDA). Figure III-1 shows the concentration change 
based on Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for steer and heifer slaughter. The HHI was 
0.0561 in 1980 but it was rapidly increased by 0.2005 in 1992, and has stayed around 0.2 
until recently. The Department of Justice consider the industry to be concentrated if the 
HHI is greater than 0.18. Therefore, concentration has been in the middle of controversy 
for the market power issue in the cattle procurement market during the last three decades. 
 Cattle cycles are measured from one trough to the next. There are six full cycles 
in cattle inventories since 1928 and the average length of cattle cycles are about 10 years 
(Anderson, Robb, and Mintert 1996). Figure III-2 shows the cattle cycle based on cattle 
supply from 1980 to 2009. The fifth cycle began in 1979 and the sixth cycle began in 
1990. The latest cycle began in 2004 and cattle supplies show an increasing trend.  
A seasonal pattern is a regularly repeating cycle that is completed once every 
twelve months. Figure III-2 shows the averaged monthly changes of the slaughtered 
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cattle supply from 1980 to 2009. The slaughtered cattle quantities are high from May to 
October while those from November to April are low. These cattle cycle and seasonality 
cycles are responsible for creating price fluctuation in the cattle market. 
Literature Review 
Most studies using NEIO approach use the Cournot model to analyze market power for 
the U.S. beef packing industry because it is easy to parameterize the conjectural elasticity, 
price elasticity of demand, and price elasticity of supply using simultaneous equations. 
Additionally, those elasticities can be used to easily calculate market power (Schroeter 
1988; Azzam and Schroeter 1995; Azzam 1997; Sexton 2000; Lopez, Azzam and Espana 
2002; Tostao and Chung 2005; Zheng and Vukina 2009). 
 There are three studies that use the Bertrand oligopsony model for the cattle 
market (Koontz, Garcia, and Hudson 1993; Koontz and Garcia 1997; Cai, Stiegert, and 
Koontz 2009). They develop the Regime-Switching model based on the dynamic non-
cooperative game theoretic model. They find that the evidence of 
cooperative/competitive conduct among the beef packers is present, but the conduct 
varies across markets. They attempt to determine whether the cooperative conduct is 
present as evidence of market power, but they don’t estimate the conduct parameters in 
the cattle procurement market.  
Two studies are concerned with cattle supply and cattle cycle. Stiegert, Azzam, 
and Brorsen (1993) use the NEIO model assuming quantity competition to determine the 
effect of anticipated and unanticipated cattle supply on the departure of fed cattle prices 
from cattle’s marginal value product. They find that packers follow an average 
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processing cost (APC) pricing rule and that reducing concentration is unlikely to affect 
change in cattle prices predicted by SCP based studies of the industry
1
. They use 
anticipated and unanticipated cattle supply to look into packer’s behavior, primarily how 
packers react to those cattle supplies. The anticipated cattle supply is specified by the 
cattle on feed, cattle placements, and the seasonal dummy variable. Therefore, the effects 
of cattle cycle and seasonality are embedded in the anticipated cattle supply. 
Consequently, they do not explain the effects of cattle cycle and seasonality. Crespi, Xia 
and Jones (2010) investigate the relationship between market power and cattle cycle with 
a dynamic cattle production decision model and a dynamic profit maximization model 
based on the Cournot model. They provide a conceptual framework for how the cattle 
cycle and buyer markets are related. They find that a larger cattle stock leads to a lower 
fed cattle price and the cattle stock’s negative effect on price is magnified by the degree 
of buyer market power. They develop an equilibrium model that consists of the dynamic 
cattle supply equation for feeders and dynamic cattle demand for packers. However, they 
assume that the market power is determined by the number of packers rather than the 
packer’s market conducts.  
Therefore, this paper extends the traditional NEIO model in two ways. First, this 
paper provides how the implications of market power from the Bertrand model differ 
compared to the Cournot model through analytical derivation. Second, concentration in 
the traditional view as well as cattle cycle and seasonality for the nature of cattle market 
are included in modeling the market conduct equation in order to measure their effects on 
market power. 
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The Model 
The two NEIO models are reviewed in this section: the Bertrand model and the Cournot 
model. We analyze the input market rather than output market, so we use monopsony or 
oligopsony as working terms instead of monopoly or oligopoly. In the Bertrand 
oligopsony model, buyers choose the price to pay for a unit of input, which affects the 
market supply. The Bertrand model predicts that a duopsony is enough to push prices up 
to the marginal cost level for input production. This suggests that duopsony will result in 
perfect competition, commonly referred to in the economics literature as the “Bertrand 
paradox”. However, in the Cournot oligopsony model, where buyers compete 
strategically with their quantity, buyers enjoy positive profits as the resulting input 
market prices do not exceed those of the marginal costs. By imposing some assumptions 
in the modeling, we will demonstrate how this suggestion that duopsony will result in 
perfect competition in the Bertrand model could be changed. 
Bertrand Model 
In view of the intended application, we will focus on oligopsony market power in the 
cattle procurement market. Packers determine cattle price as a strategy variable to 
maximize their profit from the cattle procurement market while the wholesale price to 
sell their output, boxed beef, to the retailer is assumed as a given. The cattle supply is 
assumed as fixed in the short-run because feeders cannot increase their cattle supply in 
the short-run. Feeders cannot determine the cattle supply, but they can sell their cattle to 
the highest bidder in the cattle market. 
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In the beef processing industry it is assumed that N  packers convert a single farm 
input, cattle, into a final output, boxed beef, with fixed proportions technology between 
the farm input and the output (Schroeter 1988; Azzam 1997). Conversion of the farm 
input into output requires non-farm inputs that are purchased in competitive markets. 
Profit, 
i
 , for the i th firm (for Ni ,,2,1  ) is: 
(3.1)                     )),(,(())(,( vijiiiijiiii
w
wwwqCwwwqwPMax
i
 , 
where P  is the boxed beef wholesale price, 
i
w  is the cattle input price for i th firm, jw  
is the cattle input price for j th firm (for Nj ,,2,1   and ji  ), iq  is the i th firm’s 
beef product or cattle input, ),( v
ii
qC  is the processing cost for the i th firm, and v  is a 
vector of prices of non-farm inputs. The first order condition for profit maximization is: 
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Rearranging the first order condition and re-writing in elasticity form yields: 
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 is the i th firm’s marginal cost. 
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If we assume that the effect of the j th firm’s price change on the i th firm’s fed 
cattle purchase is smaller than the effect of its own price change, and firms are symmetric 
(Cai, Stiegert, and Koontz 2009), this means 
i
j
j
i
i
i
i
i
q
w
w
q
q
w
w
q





 and then we can write 
the ratio of own price elasticity of cattle procurement to cross price elasticity with respect 
to j th firm’s price, as 1
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 . In equilibrium, all firms have the same value 
i
 , 
i
R  and 
ii
 , then the 
industry level margin equation can be yield (Appelbaum 1982; Schroeter 1988): 
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where W  is the industrial level cattle price, 
 
is the industrial level price conjectural 
elasticity, R  is the industrial level ratio of own price elasticity of cattle procurement to 
cross price elasticity, 
b
  is the own price elasticity of cattle purchase, and mc  is the 
industrial level marginal cost. 
In equation (3.5), the term in the left side is the industrial level margin for a unit 
of cattle, the first term on the right side is markdown for a unit of cattle in the cattle 
procurement market, and the second term on the right side is the marginal cost for a unit 
of cattle in the beef processing industry. For analyzing the short-run oligopsony power in 
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the cattle procurement market we should look at the markdown term. The markdown is 
determined by three parameters: the price conjectural elasticity, the ratio of own price 
elasticity of cattle procurement to cross price elasticity, and the own price elasticity of 
cattle purchase. These three parameters show the market participant’s reactions about a 
firm’s cattle pricing change. That is, the price conjectural elasticity shows the reaction of 
the rival’s cattle pricing, the ratio of own price elasticity of cattle procurement to cross 
price elasticity shows the relative effect firms’ price change on a firm’s cattle purchase, 
and the own price elasticity of cattle purchase reveals the decision of the feeder’s cattle 
supply decision to choose who they sell their cattle to, corresponding to a firm’s pricing 
change. 
The own price elasticity of cattle purchase, 
b
 , is an infinite in the traditional 
view of the Bertrand model so that the market will reflect perfect competition with no 
markdown in the industry.
2
 In reality, however, there are some restrictions like capacity 
constraints. If a single firm does not have the capacity to procure the whole cattle market 
then the “price equals marginal cost” result may not hold. Thus, the range of the own 
price elasticity of cattle purchase will be 
b
0 . This reflects that the “Bertrand 
paradox” can be fixed if the own price elasticity of cattle purchase is quite smaller than 
the infinite. The own price elasticity of cattle purchase is usually greater than the price 
elasticity of cattle supply, 
Q
W
W
Q
c


  (Anderson, Palma, and Kreider 2001). 
For the market conduct in equation (3.5), when 
b
 , the market will be perfect 
competition. When 
b
0 , the market will be oligopsony or monopsony. Under this 
assumption, 
b
0 , market conduct depends on the price conjectural elasticity,  . 
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0  means Bertrand-Nash when 1N  and pure monopsony when 1N . 1  means 
cartel or symmetry among the firms and R0  means oligopsony.
3
 
Cournot Model 
Alternatively, in the Cournot model packers determine cattle quantities as a strategy 
variable to procure the cattle from the cattle procurement market and feeders determine 
the cattle supply to the cattle procurement market. Finally, cattle price is determined in 
the market by cattle supply and demand. That is, the fixed supply assumption is released 
by long-run decision making for feeders and the feeders face a competitive market for 
selling their cattle to packers. Under the same assumption of the fixed proportions 
technology, then i th firm’s profit is: 
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where P  is the beef wholesale price, W  is the cattle price in the market level, and 
i
q  is 
the i th firm’s cattle or boxed beef quantity. The first order condition for profit 
maximization is:
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Rearranging the first order condition and re-writing in elasticity form yields: 
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is the i th firm’s quantity conjectural elasticity and 
Q
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  is 
the price elasticity of cattle supply in the cattle procurement market. In equilibrium, all 
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firms have the same value 
i
 , then the industry level margin equation can be written 
(Appelbaum 1982; Schroeter 1988): 
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In the Cournot model, markdown consists of the quantity conjectural elasticity, 
, and the cattle supply elasticity, 
c
 . The range of conjectural elasticity is between 0 and 
1. The value 0  means perfect competition and 1  means pure monopsony, and 
other values mean various degrees of oligopsony power with higher values of   
denoting greater oligopsony (Appelbaum 1982). The price elasticity of cattle supply, 
c
 , 
is considered as 10 
c
  because price elasticity of supply for agricultural markets are 
usually inelastic and positive. 
Empirical Procedures 
For econometric estimation, we assume a generalized Leontief cost function (Diewert 
1974; Schroeter 1988) for the beef processing industry: 
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where 
j
v  and kv  are the input price of labor, capital, and material. Then the industrial 
level marginal processing cost function is given by: 
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by substituting equation (3.11) into equation (3.5), we obtain the industrial level Bertrand 
margin equation: 
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where 
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R )1(
1

 is the industry-wide markdown in cattle prices from cattle’s marginal 
value and 
b
e  is the error term for the Bertrand margin equation respectively. However, 
the parameters in the industry-wide markdown cannot be estimated because of limitation 
of firm level data. Consequently, we estimate the whole part of the industry-wide 
markdown, 
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 , as follow: 
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To estimate the margin equations (3.13), simultaneous equations are needed such 
as three non-farm input demand equations. Non-farm input demands are obtained by 
applying Shephard’s lemma on the industry level processing cost function represented by 
equation (3.10) as: 
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which can be re-arranged as: 
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where 
j
X  is the industry level derived non-farm input demand for labor, capital, and 
material, QX
j
 is the inverse of productivity for each non-farm input, and 
j
e  is the error 
term for the non-farm input demand equation respectively. 
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Finally, to analyze the effect of concentration, cattle cycle, and seasonality on the 
cattle price, we make the markdown as a function of these variables. This specification 
also allows the dynamic estimation of the market conduct over time. The industry-wide 
markdown M
 
is specified as:
                    
 
(3.16)                          
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where H
 
is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, C
 
is the cattle cycle, and 
i
D  with 
3,2,1i
 
are seasonal dummy variables, and  ’s are parameters. In order to generate 
cattle cycle variability, the following yearly cattle supply equation is estimated: 
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and the cattle cycle variable, QQC ˆ , is calculated for each year. If equation (3.16) 
substitutes into equation (3.13), then dynamic equation can be written as: 
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We utilize two systems: the static model and the dynamic model for three regions: 
National, Nebraska, and Texas. Equations (3.13) and (3.15) constitute a system of four 
equations for the static model and equations (3.18) and (3.15) constitute a system of four 
equations for the dynamic model. We use the generalized method of moment (GMM) 
which employs instrumental variable estimators since the system equations have 
endogeneity problems. GMM also provides a consistent estimator when 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation are present (Breusch 1978; Godfrey 1978). The 
eighteen instrumental variables included in the equation are Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI) for the steer and heifer slaughter, 5 market steer weighted price, Nebraska steer 
and heifer weighted price, Texas steer and heifer weighted price, labor price, capital price, 
78 
 
material price, cattle on feed, cattle placement, cattle on marketing, disappearance, cycle, 
seasonal dummy variables, time, and squared time. The industry-wide markdown rates as 
market power indices and markdowns in cattle prices from cattle’s marginal value for 
each year are also estimated through GMM using the MODEL Procedure in SAS 9.2. 
The first null hypothesis is that oligopsony market power in the U.S. cattle 
procurement market equal zero. Rejecting it suggests that packers exert oligopsony 
market power in the U.S. cattle procurement market. The second null hypothesis is that 
the concentration, the cattle cycle, and the seasonality have no effect on the oligopsony 
market power. Rejecting it suggests that the concentration, the cattle cycle, and the 
seasonality might be used as a way to price under the marginal cost for cattle production. 
Data 
In this paper, we use monthly data series for the U.S. cattle procurement market ranging 
from 1980 to 2009. As National, Nebraska, and Texas cattle supplies, the steer and heifer 
slaughter total live weights for National level, for Nebraska region, and Texas region are 
from Livestock Slaughter Annual Summary of United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA). The wholesale price and the 5 market steer weighted price data are from the 
beef value and price spread monthly data sets from the USDA Economic Research 
Service (ERS). The wholesale price is modified by including by-product value and by 
dividing with 2.4 as conversion factor to a unit of live cattle (USDA). The steer and 
heifer weighted prices data for Nebraska and Texas are compiled from USDA 
Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) data. The producer price index for farm products 
slaughter steer and heifer is from Bureau Labor Statistics (BLS). The price index and the 
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productivity index of labor, capital, and material for U.S. food and other industries are 
obtained from the Major Sector Multifactor Productivity Index Database of BLS. The 
cattle on feed, the cattle placement, the cattle on marketing, and disappearance data are 
from the USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service and Red Meats Yearbook of 
USDA. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for the U.S. beef processing industry is the 
steer and heifer slaughter concentration index compiled from several annual reports from 
the Packers and Stockyards Statistical Report (1996-2009). The definitions and 
descriptive statistics of these variables are presented in table III-1. 
Empirical Results 
The estimation results of the static model and the dynamic model for the National level, 
Nebraska region, and Texas region by GMM are reported in table III-2 and III-3. All of 
the 10 parameter estimates in the static model and most parameter estimates in the 
dynamic model for National, Nebraska, and Texas are statistically significant at the 5% 
significance level.  
With these estimation results and with mean values of cattle prices and input 
prices, the market power parameters such as market power (industry-wide markdown 
rate), markdown, and marginal cost are calculated and summarized in table III-4. As the 
key parameter, the market power estimates in the static model are 0.0366, 0.0199, and 
0.0138 for National, Nebraska, and Texas respectively while 0.0629, 0.0401, and 0.0377 
in the dynamic model. The market power of National is the biggest compared to the two 
regions and the market power of Nebraska is greater than the market power of Texas. The 
market power from the dynamic model shows the same results with the static model, but 
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their value is almost twice that of the static models’. The values of 0.0366, 0.0199, and 
0.0138 for market power in the static model mean that there are about 3.66 percent, 1.99 
percent, and 1.38 percent of markdowns for the cattle price respectively. 
For the markdowns and the marginal costs, in the static model, the markdowns are 
2.6537, 1.4368, and 1.0039 and the marginal costs are 6.7237, 8.1916, and 8.0956 for 
National, Nebraska, and Texas respectively and they are all significant at the 5% 
significance level. In the dynamic model, the markdowns are 4.5645, 2.8905, and 2.7486 
and the marginal costs are 5.3866, 6.9359, and 6.5899 for National, Nebraska, and Texas 
respectively and they are also all significant at the 5% significance level. The markdown 
value of 2.6537 and marginal cost of 6.7237 for National in the static model mean that 
the average markdown for the cattle price is $ 2.65/cwt and the marginal cost of cattle 
slaughter is $ 6.72/cwt, respectively. These results of market power and markdown for 
Nebraska and Texas in the static model are similar to the results of Schroeter (1988) and 
Stiegert, Azzam, and Brorsen (1993) while the results for National and dynamic model 
are slightly bigger than their results.  
The dynamic model shows the effect of concentration, cattle cycle, and 
seasonality. The parameters of concentration, cattle cycle, and three seasonal variables 
for National are -0.2491, 0.0082, -0.0122, 0.0169, and 0.0085 respectively. They are all 
significant at the 5% significance level. Nebraska and Texas also show similar estimation 
results. These results signify that concentration has a negative impact on the cattle price 
markdown. That is, the markdown in cattle price is decreased by increasing the 
concentration. This result coincides with a majority of results from similar studies 
(Azzam 1997; Stiegert, Azzam, and Brorsen 1993). The parameters of cattle cycle and 
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seasonality for May-July and Aug-Oct are positive while the parameter of seasonality for 
Feb-Apr is negative. This result means that when the cattle supply is greater than the 
normal trends (or expected supply), packers exercise more market power in the cattle 
procurement market and vice versa. This result supports the view of SCP that when the 
cattle supply is inflated the packers tacitly collude to drop the cattle price. When the 
cattle supply is short the packers bid aggressively to get some amount of cattle in the cash 
market. 
The dynamic model allows market power to change over time, so we calculate the 
market powers for each year. Figure III-4 shows the changes of the market power and 
cattle supply. The cattle supply fluctuates with an increasing trend while market power 
fluctuates with a decreasing trend. This decreasing trend of market power is incompatible 
with the traditional opinion that an increase of concentration will increase market power. 
However, the market power for National, Nebraska, and Texas have fluctuated along 
with the cattle cycle over the given time period. Therefore, we can conclude that the 
cattle cycle causes the oligopsony market power in the cattle procurement market and 
that the market power has been fluctuating and declining over time. This finding also 
coincides with the previous studies (Stiegert, Azzam, and Brorsen 1993; Crespi, Xia, and 
Jones 2010).  
In summary, the first null hypothesis that oligopsony market powers in the U.S. 
cattle procurement market equal zero is rejected in all regions and both static and 
dynamic model. Therefore, we can conclude that packers exert an oligopsony market 
power over the U.S. cattle procurement market. The second null hypotheses that the 
concentration, the cattle cycle, and the seasonality have no effect on the oligopsony 
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market power are all rejected. That means the packers use the cattle supply and the 
seasonality to increase their margins by pricing cattle under the marginal cost of cattle 
production. However, the concentration has a negative effect on the oligopsony market 
power. That is, the markdown decreases by increasing the concentration for the sample 
period. This result may support the hypothesis that cost efficiency dominates the effect of 
market power by increasing the concentration. 
Conclusions 
There are many controversial issues about market power in the U.S. cattle procurement 
market. Many believe that the major beef processing companies attempt to merge and 
acquire the other companies as a viable strategy to increase their market powers. 
However, some studies indicate that such consolidation amongst packers leads to the 
increase of their efficiency in beef processing cost, rather than increasing the market 
power. Therefore, this study looks into the beef packing industry from the perspective 
that the market power may not be from the concentration, but from the characteristics of 
cattle production such as cattle cycle and seasonality. If the market power is caused by 
cattle supply, then the packers may compete with price instead of quantity. That is, 
following the SCP theory, when the cattle supply is short the packers might bid 
aggressively for procuring the cattle (low markdown) and when the cattle supply is 
enough the packers will bid less aggressively (high markdown).  
From this view point, we use the Bertrand model that assumes price competition 
in the market and we compare it to the Cournot model. In addition, the dynamic model 
with the time varying model is used to look into the dynamic change of market conducts 
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which is caused by the concentration, the cattle cycle, and the seasonality for the U.S. 
cattle procurement market. Three regions: National, Nebraska, and Texas, are estimated 
with the monthly data from 1980 to 2007. 
The empirical results show that there exists oligopsony market power in the U.S. 
cattle procurement market. The oligopsony market power is influenced by the cattle cycle 
and seasonality. That is, the packers may tacitly collude during the excessive cattle 
supply period, while biding to price more aggressively during the short cattle supply 
period. The variation of market power equivalently changes with the cattle cycle. 
However, concentration has a negative effect on market power in cattle procurement 
market. These results suggest that it is more important to make cattle supply stable and to 
continue monitoring the cattle procurement market to assure a competitive performance. 
Nevertheless, this research is limited in estimating the Bertrand model derived from this 
study because the parameters to be estimated require firm level data. Therefore, 
additional research needs to develop a more suitable model to continue this study.  
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Notes 
1. Average processing cost (APC) pricing is that packers establish a cattle bid price 
by subtracting the average processing cost from the price received for carcasses or 
boxed beef while the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm theory 
suggests that the markdown will respond to supply changes, but in a direction 
opposite to that of APC pricing. That is, as anticipated supply declines, packers 
bid more aggressive while anticipated supply is abundant, bidding becomes less 
aggressively and the markdown increases (Stiegert, Azzam, and Brorsen 1993). 
2. The Bertrand model rests on the following assumptions: 1) There are at least two 
firms producing homogeneous (undifferentiated) products; 2) Firms do not 
cooperate; 3) Firms compete by setting prices simultaneously; 4) Consumers buy 
everything from a firm with a lower price. If all firms charge the same price, 
consumers randomly select among them (Bertrand 1883). The fourth assumption 
represents that the own price elasticity is infinite. 
3. Koontz, Garcia, and Hudson (1993) interpret the value of 0  means packers 
display non-cooperative pricing and the value of 0  means packers have 
cooperative pricing in the cattle procurement market. 
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Table III-1. Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used in the Empirical Estimation 
(1980.1-2009.12, N=360) 
Variable Symbol Mean S. D. Minimum Maximum 
National margin (cattle price based) 
($/cwt) 
WP   10.82   2.87     4.64   21.04 
Nebraska margin (cattle price 
based) ($/cwt) 
WP   11.12   2.83     4.81   22.05 
Texas margin (cattle price based) 
($/cwt) 
WP 
 
10.39   3.09     4.63   20.38 
Wholesale price of boxed beef 
($/cwt) 
P  201.10 29.65 146.00 292.99 
National cattle price (5 market steer 
price) ($/cwt) 
W    72.47 10.30   52.33 100.67 
Nebraska cattle price (steer and 
heifer weighted price) ($/cwt) 
W    72.16 10.27   52.70 102.63 
Texas cattle price (steer and heifer 
weighted price) ($/cwt) 
W    72.88 10.23   53.80   99.81 
Herfindahl Hirschman index for 
steer and heifer slaughter 
H  0.1606 0.0464 0.0561 0.2096 
National steer and heifer slaughter 
weight (bil./lbs) 
Q  2.6673 0.2852 2.0420 3.3290 
Nebraska steer and heifer slaughter 
weight (bil./lbs) 
Q
 1.3669 0.2081 0.9169 1.8218 
National steer and heifer slaughter 
weight (bil./lbs) 
Q
 0.4958 0.0625 0.3683 0.6640 
Labor productivity (2000=100) lXQ    97.04   8.13   83.57 112.85 
Price of labor (2000=100) lv    88.88 27.14   44.26 138.92 
Capital productivity (2000=100) cXQ  102.25   1.73   99.58 105.62 
Price of capital (2000=100) cv    78.37 20.53   45.92 111.85 
Material productivity (2000=100) mXQ  
  90.56   7.87   78.18 102.57 
Price of material (2000=100) mv  
100.83 21.26   70.50 159.97 
PPI for farm products slaughter 
steers and heifers (2000=100) 
PPI
 
104.63   14.32   73.28 157.47 
Cycle (bil./lbs) C
 
0.0036 1.4399 -2.4688 2.1768 
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Table III-2. GMM Estimates of the Parameters for the Static Model for the National, 
Nebraska, and Texas regions cattle procurement market 
Parameter Natioanl Nebraska Texas 
M   0.0366 (0.0035)  0.0199 (0.0030)  0.0138 (0.0030) 
ll

 
 2.5482 (0.0646)  2.8537 (0.0030)  2.3866 (0.0563) 
cc
   0.8399 (0.0196)  0.5890 (0.0122)  0.4369 (0.0083) 
mm
   3.2068 (0.0881)  3.1615 (0.0783)  2.7948 (0.0716) 
lc
   0.1974 (0.0090)  0.1036 (0.0096)  0.2540 (0.0093) 
cm
  -0.8431 (0.0247) -0.5181 (0.0154) -0.5190 (0.0144) 
ml
  -2.5985 (0.0681) -2.8287 (0.0673) -2.4834 (0.0610) 
l

 
 0.2767 (0.0113)  0.1997 (0.0071)  0.0420 (0.0023) 
c
  -0.1801 (0.0094) -0.1188 (0.0045) -0.0477 (0.0014) 
m
  -0.1562 (0.1031) -0.1279 (0.0069) -0.0174 (0.0023) 
Notes: All parameters are significant at the 5% significance level. 
           Parentheses are approximate standard errors. 
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Table III-3. GMM Estimates of the Parameters for the Dynamic Model for the 
National, Nebraska, and Texas regions cattle procurement market 
Parameter National Nebraska Texas 
0
   0.0996 (0.0048)**  0.0556 (0.0068)**  0.0467 (0.0057)** 
1
  -0.2491 (0.0193)** -0.1017 (0.0266)** -0.0923 (0.0231)** 
2
   0.0082 (0.0005)**  0.0078 (0.0005)**  0.0078 (0.0005)** 
3
  -0.0122 (0.0021)** -0.0156 (0.0023)** -0.0096 (0.0023)* 
4
   0.0169 (0.0024)**  0.0138 (0.0026)**  0.0216 (0.0024)** 
5
   0.0085 (0.0026)**  0.0049 (0.0027)*  0.0113 (0.0026)** 
ll

 
 2.2445 (0.0899)**  3.4504 (0.1371)**  2.8893 (0.1079)** 
cc
   1.2642 (0.0520)**  1.2656 (0.0505)**  1.1123 (0.0396)** 
mm
   1.5938 (0.0736)**  2.1705 (0.0993)**  1.7552 (0.0786)** 
lc
  -0.7592 (0.0311)** -1.1053 (0.0434)** -0.9295 (0.0331)** 
cm
  -0.3474 (0.0182)** -0.0063 (0.0116) -0.0282 (0.0069)** 
ml
  -1.4017 (0.0595)** -2.2825 (0.0971)** -0.8708 (0.0765)** 
l

 
 0.0302 (0.0191)  0.1341 (0.0158)**  0.0174 (0.0044)** 
c
  -0.1331 (0.0146)** -0.1042 (0.0083)** -0.0415 (0.0026)** 
m
   0.0410 (0.0147)** -0.0690 (0.0116)**  0.0052 (0.0036) 
Notes: *  significant at the 10% significance level. 
           ** significant at the 5% significance level. 
           Parentheses are approximate standard errors. 
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Table III-4. Oligopsony Market Power, Markdown, and Marginal Cost for the U.S. 
Cattle Procurement Market 
Market Power 
Static Model Dynamic Model 
National Nebraska Texas National Nebraska Texas 
Market Power 
(%) 
0.0366 
(0.0035) 
0.0199 
(0.0030) 
0.0138 
(0.0030) 
0.0629 
(0.0030) 
0.0401 
(0.0036) 
0.0377 
(0.0035) 
Markdown 
($/cwt) 
2.6537 
(0.2525) 
1.4368 
(0.2188) 
1.0039 
(0.2159) 
4.5645 
(0.2200) 
2.8905 
(0.2578) 
2.7486 
(0.2575) 
Marginal Cost 
($/cwt) 
6.7237 
(0.1965) 
8.1916 
(0.1700) 
8.0956 
(0.1682) 
5.3866 
(0.1763) 
6.9359 
(0.1954) 
6.5899 
(0.2091) 
Notes: Parentheses are approximate standard errors. 
           All estimates are statistical significant at the 5% significance level. 
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Figure III-1. The Concentration (HHI for Steer and Heifer) Change for U.S. Cattle 
Procurement Market from 1980 to 2009 
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Figure III-2. The Cattle Supply for the U.S. Cattle Procurement Market from 1980 
to 2009 
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Figure III-3. The Average Monthly Changes of Slaughtered Cattle for the U.S. 
Cattle Procurement Market from 1980 to 2009 
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Figure III-4. The Changes of Market Power and Cattle Supply for the U.S. Cattle 
Procurement Market from 1980 to 2009 
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more unstable than oligopoly market power throughout the entire sample period. 
Concentration and captive supply play a role in increasing market power. The cost 
efficiency effects caused by increasing concentration and captive supply outweigh the 
market power effects. 
 
The third essay uses the new empirical industrial organization approach with the 
Bertrand model to measure the oligopsony market power in the U.S. cattle procurement 
market. It tests whether the market power is caused by concentration, cattle cycle, and 
seasonality. The results show that the oligopsony market power exists in the U.S. cattle 
procurement market. The cattle cycle and seasonality affect the oligopsony market power 
and the cattle cycle causes the change in market power. However, concentration has a 
negative effect on the oligopsony market power. 
